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Abstract
The insight that animals’ cognitive abilities are linked to their evolutionary history, and hence their ecology, provides the
framework for the comparative approach. Despite primates renowned dietary complexity and social cognition, including
cooperative abilities, we here demonstrate that cleaner wrasse outperform three primate species, capuchin monkeys,
chimpanzees and orang-utans, in a foraging task involving a choice between two actions, both of which yield identical
immediate rewards, but only one of which yields an additional delayed reward. The foraging task decisions involve partner
choice in cleaners: they must service visiting client reef fish before resident clients to access both; otherwise the former
switch to a different cleaner. Wild caught adult, but not juvenile, cleaners learned to solve the task quickly and relearned the
task when it was reversed. The majority of primates failed to perform above chance after 100 trials, which is in sharp
contrast to previous studies showing that primates easily learn to choose an action that yields immediate double rewards
compared to an alternative action. In conclusion, the adult cleaners’ ability to choose a superior action with initially neutral
consequences is likely due to repeated exposure in nature, which leads to specific learned optimal foraging decision rules.
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Introduction
The ecological approach to cognition proposes that a species’
ability to solve a particular problem is tightly linked to its
evolutionary history and, hence, to the ecological conditions under
which it was selected [1–3]. A classic example is the tight link
between spatial memory abilities and the dependency on food
caching in corvids [4]. The ecological approach provides a general
functional theoretical framework which allows for the integration
of studies on any animal species, including invertebrates, such as
the demonstration of sophisticated spatial orientation skills of bees
[5], and the ability of jumping spiders to plan where to go to in
order to attack prey [6]. The ecological approach has led to a great
diversification of animals studied, and in particular to the
appreciation that animal clades that lack particularly large and
complexly structured brains may provide examples of impressive
cognitive abilities. This is in particular true for fishes [7], which
have provided some excellent examples for complex social
strategies. Male cichlids (Astatotilapia burtoni) use transitive inference
to predict fighting abilities of competitors [8] and sticklebacks
(Pungitius pungitius) employ so-called hill climbing social learning
strategies [9], in which they compare their own foraging success
with the success of observed individuals to update foraging
decisions. Another example involves the foraging decisions of
cleaner wrasse, Labroides dimidiatus. These cleaner fish occupy small
territories (so-called ‘cleaning stations’) in which they interact with
a variety of reef fish species (so-called ‘clients’) from which they
remove ectoparasites, but also mucus and scales [10]. Conflict
occurs because cleaners prefer to eat mucus over ectoparasites
[11], where eating the former constitutes cheating (for a review of
cleaners’ decision rules, see [12,13]). Cleaners adjust levels of
cooperation to the strategic options available to clients to react to
cheating by cleaners. Predatory clients typically receive the highest
service quality, whereas non-predatory resident clients, who lack
choice options, punish cleaners for cheating. Visiting clients who
have access to alternative cleaning stations receive faster service
than resident clients that have access to only one cleaning station.
This is because visiting clients represent an ephemeral food source:
they may swim off and visit another cleaner for their next
inspection if not inspected immediately. In contrast, resident
clients must wait for inspection because of a lack of alternatives.
Furthermore, cleaners pay attention to the presence of potential
clients and are more cooperative to current clients if that allows
them to access bystanders [14]. Thus, cleaner wrasse show high
adaptation to the specifics of an interaction in their foraging
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decisions, which are at the same time linked to interspecific social
behavior. The precision with which cleaners adapt current service
quality to current conditions may be predicted by their ecology:
cleaners have over 2000 interactions per day with a great variety of
clients and fully depend on cleaning for their diet [15], thus their
performance during the interactions has a major impact on their
fitness. However, the ecological approach is rather nonspecific
with respect to the cognitive processes that underlie the
performance. Hence, we cannot infer from the precision and
flexibility in cleaner foraging decisions that they warrant much
learning, memory or comprehension and hence, ultimately any
adaptive changes in corresponding brain areas. In addition, we do
not know whether reaching their food maximizing decisions
involves widespread learning rules or whether rather specific
abilities must be evolved or developed. Thus the question of
interest is whether any (vertebrate) species could easily behave like
a cleaner wrasse if it switched its diet to ectoparasites and mucus of
fishes, or whether specific selection pressures on cleaner wrasses
have caused specific abilities? And if specific abilities do exist in
cleaner wrasses, what is the role of cognition?
Here, we provide the first test of the hypothesis that cleaner
wrasse foraging decisions are the result of specific cognitive
abilities. Our laboratory experiment involved two identical food
sources – two plates differing in colour and patterns to allow
discrimination, but providing exactly the same food - where one
source (plate) was ephemeral and the other one permanent. This
mimicked the simultaneous visit of a resident and a visitor to the
cleaning station. Accordingly, the food maximizing solution
involved eating from the ephemeral food source first and only
then from the permanent one. The potential difficulty of the task is
due to the fact that no matter which plate an individual chooses
first, it will receive exactly the same immediate reward, and only
then will it (possibly) have the chance to perform a second act that
would yield an additional reward. Thus, the initial decision may
not lead to reinforcement learning unless an animal is somehow
able to integrate the future consequences into its immediate
decision. Despite theoretical considerations indicating that the task
is not trivial to solve, a previous study suggested that cleaners could
quickly solve it, though individual learning was not investigated
[16]. In order to test whether the ability to solve the task is linked
to its ecological relevance and whether the solution by cleaners
reflect specific learning rules, we subjected both adult and juvenile
wild-caught cleaners as well as three primate species to the task.
The comparison between adult and juvenile cleaners allowed us to
address the potential role of individual experience. Client
composition shifts during ontogeny, with adult cleaners interacting
about three times more frequently with visitors than do juveniles
(comparing data published in [17,18]). Thus, juveniles rarely
experience the situation in which a visitor and a resident seek
cleaning simultaneously. Therefore, if adult cleaners perform
better than juveniles that would indicate that individual experience
in the field helps to solve the abstract laboratory task.
An important aspect of the ecological approach is to test
whether other species that do not engage in cleaning interactions
are less able to solve the task. We decided to use primates –
capuchin monkeys, chimpanzees and orang-utans – for the
comparison for several reasons. First, the general circumstances
of the cleaners’ decisions involve social interactions and foraging,
which matches the two contexts that have been proposed to select
for large brains in primates [19–22]. Second, primates, and in
particular our three study species, have been shown to possess a
large array of cognitive mechanisms in the context of social
behavior and foraging. Specifically, all three species have a
complex diet and have been classified as extractive foragers [21].
In addition, at least chimpanzees and capuchins hunt for meat and
catch mobile insects and reptiles [23–25], and in doing so,
encounter ephemeral food sources. Moreover, all three species are
able to solve some cooperation tasks in the laboratory [26–32],
and capuchins and chimpanzees do so in the wild [23–25,33].
Also, our task involved the ability to take not only immediate but
also future consequences into consideration, an ability that
primates have repeatedly demonstrated in foraging experiments
(delayed rewards experiments: [34,35]; planning experiments:
[36–39]). Finally, all three of our primate study species have large
brains compared to other species, and large relative brain sizes
(e.g., brain-to-body or neocortex-to-body ratios) even compared to
other primates [40], again indicating high general cognitive
abilities.
Although evidence suggests that the primates will excel in tasks
that involve future consequences in the context of cooperation and
foraging, the specifics of our task may favor cleaners. For example,
cooperation and foraging are intertwined in cleaners in a way that
is absent in primates; most importantly, cleaners cooperate with
their food sources. In addition, primates encounter ephemeral
food sources (e.g., insects, small vertebrates) unpredictably and
opportunistically, and thus the ecological constraints are quite
different from those of the fish, for whom the interaction with
ephemeral sources is predictable. Based on this, we predicted that
unlike the cleaner wrasse, the primates would not perceive the task
as a social interaction but just as an optimal foraging task. Thus,
our experiment offered us the opportunity to test the ecological
intelligence hypothesis in a quite specific way. We expect that if
ecology is the driving force that helps to solve the problem, then
cleaners should individually learn to solve the tasks faster than any
of the primate species. Conversely, if the general context and brain
size (relative or absolute) prepare better for the task than rather
specific ecological conditions do, then the primates should learn to
solve the task faster than the cleaner wrasse. We also considered an
additional way to test the role of learning for the cleaners’ decision
making process, reversing the role of the two plates once an
individual reached the learning criterion. The former permanent
plate now became the ephemeral plate and vice versa. Although
cleaners are able to discriminate between different client
categories, including resident and visitor, and can even individ-
ually recognize clients [13], reversal of roles does not occur under
natural conditions, i.e. a visitor individual/species never turns into
a resident. Therefore, it appears to be highly unlikely that reversal
learning could be aided by the adaptation of an innate program.
For the primates we included this task only to see whether once the
task has been solved, they understood its general principle. We
predicted that if primates found the task initially difficult but
solving it triggered a more general understanding, then their
performance would greatly improve during the reversal.
Results
Initial learning tests
All six adult cleaner fish individuals learned to eat first from the
ephemeral plate, which was smoothly withdrawn if the cleaner
were to forage on the permanent plate first. Individuals took 3–10
sessions (of 10 trials each) to reach the criterion of significance with
a median of 4.5 sessions. In contrast to the adult cleaners, only one
juvenile cleaner and two out of four chimpanzees solved the task
within 10 sessions, and all other subjects failed (Fig. 1). Thus, there
was a significant difference in learning speed between the species/
age classes (Kruskal-Wallis Test: df = 4, H=18.4, p= 0.001). Post-
hoc comparisons revealed that adult cleaners performed better
than juvenile cleaners or any of the three primate species (Student
Species Differences in a Complex Foraging Task
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Newman-Keuls, all p,0.05). Most of the primates that failed to
learn the task developed a strong side preference (7/8 capuchin
monkeys, 3/4 orang-utans and 1/2 chimpanzees). Juvenile
cleaners that failed the task developed a preference for the
permanent plate. All primate subjects that had failed to learn the
task within 10 sessions (100 trials) were then exposed to changes in
the experimental design to learn the solution. The details varied
between species and are described in Information S1. Under the
altered conditions, all capuchin monkeys and three out of four
orang-utans eventually developed a significant preference for the
ephemeral plate while the two remaining chimpanzees failed to
learn the task at all. We then included the capuchins and the three
orang-utans in the reversal learning task.
Reversal learning
For this component of the experiment, the previously ephemeral
plate/tray became the permanent plate/tray, and vice versa. All
the adult fish developed a significant preference for the new
ephemeral plate within 10 sessions (median: 7; ranging: 6–9;
Fig. 2). With one exception it took individuals slightly longer to re-
learn the task after the plates suddenly inversed their behavior
(reversal learning phase) as compared to learning the initial
behavior of the plates (exact Wilcoxon signed rank test, n = 6,
W=213, p.0.05). The one juvenile that succeeded in the initial
task after only 20 trials apparently had had a preference for the
initial ephemeral plate: it failed to alter its preference over the next
100 reversal trials. Seven out of eight capuchins learned the
reversal task in 6–9 sessions, yielding similar results to the adult
cleaners. In contrast only one orang-utan out of three and neither
of the two chimpanzees learned the reversal task within 10
sessions. Overall, there was a non-significant difference in learning
speed between the species (Kruskal-Wallis Test excluding the one
juvenile cleaner, df = 3, H=6.8, p = 0.078). If the few chimpanzee
and orang-utan individuals were pooled as ‘apes’ the differences
between species became significant (Kruskal-Wallis Test excluding
the one juvenile cleaner, df = 2, H=6.5, p= 0.038). Post-hoc
comparisons revealed that both adult cleaners and capuchin
monkeys performed significantly better than the apes (Student
Newman-Keuls, both p,0.05). Both chimpanzees that failed the
test developed a significant side bias, whereas the orang-utans did
not develop a discernable bias. The apes’ unexpected lack of
success appeared to be due to frustration with the task [41,42].
Discussion
A key conclusion from our experiment is that the sophisticated
foraging decisions which cleaner wrasses demonstrate during
interactions with client reef fish are not easily achieved by other
species with larger and more complexly organized brains. The
ability to choose between an ephemeral and a more permanent
food source of otherwise identical quality is apparently far from
simple as the vast majority of individuals from three primate
species that otherwise excel in cognitive tasks failed to learn the
task within 100 trials, as did juvenile cleaners. However adult
cleaners consistently solved the task. Thus, our task differs from
experiments that demonstrate extremely fast learning of solutions
if individuals are placed into a key stimulus-response context, in
which even invertebrates like bees may outperform primates,
including humans [42–43].
Why the task may be difficult to solve
When confronted with a choice that directly yields two different
amounts of food primates can easily discriminate outcomes with
one reward from those with two [44–47] (for that matter, fish can
do the same [48,49]), even in cases in which the quantity to be
received is indicated symbolically (e.g., via tokens or Arabic
numerals [50–52]). Thus there must be another explanation for
the decrement in performance in the primates as compared to the
adult wrasses. We consider several possibilities for why this task
may be difficult to learn. First, assuming that both species saw the
task as a sequence of two tasks (rather than one task with two steps,
a reasonable assumption since they got fed after their first choice,
and hence before their second), then the difficulty of the task may
relate to known reinforcement mechanisms; in this case, no matter
which plate an individual chooses first, it will receive exactly the
same immediate reward, and only then will it (possibly) have the
chance to perform a second act that would yield an additional
reward. That is, our design, compared to classic associative
learning designs (i.e. go to A, then to B, then collect reward), adds
the complication of requiring animals to go to B to collect a second
reward after A already has been rewarded. Thus it is possible that
the first plate chosen becomes a conditioned stimulus that is
stronger, as it is always the first stimulus to be rewarded (and thus
may result in the greatest satisfaction). After this, there may be
Figure 1. The number of trials required for individuals to learn
to eat first from the ephemeral plate. Dots represent an individual.
The y-axis indicates the number of trials required to learn the task.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0049068.g001
Figure 2. The number of trials required for individuals to
reverse their preference when the plates switched roles (e.g.,
the permanent tray became ephemeral and the reverse). Again,
dots represent an individual, and the y-axis indicates the number of
trials required to reverse the preference.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0049068.g002
Species Differences in a Complex Foraging Task
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little novelty or information value left for the second plate,
lowering the incentive as compared to the first plate/reward. Thus
phenomena like blocking (e.g., little conditioning is occurring) or
overshadowing (e.g., less conditioning is occurring to this weaker
conditional stimulus) might explain why there seem to occur little
learning about the second plate if the first plate already has been
rewarded.
Second, it is possible that the fish experienced the removal of the
plate as a stronger punishment than did the primates. Both the fish
and the primates presumably reacted to the removal of the second
plate, containing food, as a negative reinforcer (e.g., punishment).
However, fish may have additionally experienced it as a social
punishment; one indication that they indeed perceive the task as a
cleaning situation is that they respond with tactile stimulation
when the plate returns, a behaviour cleaners use to reconcile and
to make clients stay longer under natural conditions [53] to
encourage it to stay this time. Hence negative social reinforcement
(or: social punishment) would make the task more aversive, and
hence easier to learn, for the adult fish as compared to the
primates and juvenile fish, both of which have far less experience
with this situation.
Finally, a more cognitive mechanism than associative learning
that would allow subjects to solve the task is insight based on
backwards induction. In backwards induction, one has to start
with the desired endpoint and then figure out which steps lead to
that endpoint. Evidence for backwards induction has been
demonstrated in a chimpanzee, Julia, who had to open up to 10
Plexiglas boxes with specific tools inside in the right sequence to
finally obtain food in the last box [36]. However, the primates in
our study apparently failed to use backward induction, despite a
large number of trials. Given the evidence for insight learning in
our primate species, why did they fail to use this ability? One
possibility again relates to reinforcement; Julia was not rewarded
for each step of her process, while in our experiment the subjects
were. As discussed above, it is possible that the receipt of
intermediate rewards interferes with learning mechanisms in that
it lowers the incentive value of the second reward [54].
We finally note that the apes’ unexpectedly low performance on
the reversal task was likely due to frustration with the procedure.
Apes – including some of these subjects – are typically very good at
reversal learning tasks [41,42]. Moreover, within the primates,
reversal learning performance is associated with brain size [55],
and apes typically outperform capuchins [56]. However, our
subjective impressions indicated that the apes found this task very
frustrating. Despite there being only 10 trials in a session, we
initially had to change the ITI from 5 minutes to 90 seconds in
order to get them to complete a session (see Methodological
considerations, below, for a more detailed discussion of this). Even
with the 90 second ITI, by the later sessions, apes were hitting or
grabbing the choice trays rather than choosing a reward, and often
refused to participate. We believe it was this frustration with the
task that caused the unexpectedly low performance on reversal
learning. What is perhaps more notable is that the fish did so well.
Their behavior is counter to that predicted by the primates’
association between reversal learning and brain size [55] and
deserves far more attention as a potential area in which fish
cognition equals that of the larger-brained primates (see Method-
ological considerations, below, for other areas in which fish
cognition appears to equal that of far larger brained species).
Why adult cleaner wrasses may have been able to solve
the task
We propose two non-mutually exclusive explanations for why
adult cleaners learned to solve the task. First, the cleaners may
have developed the decision rule to preferentially approach
ephemeral food under natural conditions and then applied the
same rule to this task. In contrast, the primates were born in
captivity, where sufficient food is provided multiple times per day
(at all facilities) and they rarely catch ephemeral food like
invertebrates. Second, as discussed above, the cleaners may have
perceived the task as a social interaction. In that case they would
have perceived the removal of the ephemeral plate as the loss of a
cooperation partner and hence as a negative reinforcer that
reduced the likelihood that the subject would choose the
permanent plate again on future trials. The aversion to losing
any client would make the ephemeral plate more attractive to
cleaners, whereas primates are not selected to experience either
the negative reinforcement of a missed opportunity or social
reinforcement for interacting with their foraging substrate. Thus,
we consider it likely that cleaners, but not the primates,
simultaneously experienced a positive and a negative reinforcer,
which would explain why they learned to solve the task rather
quickly as compared to the primates. If that was the case, a change
in protocol for the primates that let them perceive the interaction
as social (for example by replacing the trays with human partner)
should yield much faster learning.
If our hypotheses are correct then one would also predict that
even individuals of the closely related cleaner wrasse species L.
bicolor should have problems solving the task. This is because adult
bicolor individuals rove over large areas and typically approach
the clients they want to interact with rather than having to wait for
them at a cleaning station [57]. Thus, the distinction between
residents and visitors is not crucial to them, and they can follow
clients that are about to leave in order to prolong interactions. For
bicolor individuals, it appears to be mainly important where an
interaction takes place within their home range: they are more
cooperative in their core area than in the periphery [58]. To
explore this hypothesis, we additionally collected preliminary data
on L. bicolor. We tested two individuals in May 2009 at the
University of Neuchaˆtel following exactly the same protocol as we
used for adult L. dimidiatus. One bicolor failed to learn the initial
task within 200 trials. The other one learned the initial task in 70
trials but failed at the reversal: after a short period of random
choices it redeveloped a preference for the initially ephemeral
plate. Taken together, there is thus a significant difference in
overall performance (in trials to complete the entire experiment)
between the two species (Mann-Whitney-U-Test, m= 6, n= 2,
U= 0, p,0.05). Clearly, more bicolor individuals should be tested
(unfortunately, they are very difficult to obtain from licensed
commercial pet shops; three individuals were all we managed to
obtain over a six week search period, with one not willing to
participate in the experiment). Nevertheless, the preliminary
results suggest that the ability of L. dimidiatus individuals to solve
the task is linked to very specific ecological conditions that are not
met in L. bicolor.
A comparison between juvenile and adult cleaners
There are various potential explanations for why juveniles failed
to solve the task while adults managed. One possibility is that
maturation processes in the brain preclude juveniles from solving
the problem at hand. Second, there were small differences in the
experimental protocol due to different research sites and in turn
testing possibilities: juveniles – kept on Lizard Island for the period
of the experiment - experienced longer time intervals between
subsequent trials as compared to the adults which where housed
and tested in Neuchaˆtel, Switzerland. However, in an earlier
experiment adult cleaner fish that were trained on a similar task
(i.e. ‘‘one plate remains until inspected while the other does not’’,
Species Differences in a Complex Foraging Task
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p. 132), but with 30 min intervals between trials, significantly
chose to first clean the plate that would not wait until being
inspected [16]. Thus we doubt that the differences in the ITI are
reason enough for the differences in learning performance.
While maturation and (to a lesser extent if at all) experimental
design may have affected the results, we consider it likely that
individual experience plays a major role; juveniles have fewer
visiting clients and are therefore rarely in a situation that calls for
this discrimination. The situation changes for adults; in a field
study, adults had to make choices between a visitor and a resident
client more than twice per hour (120 times in 52 hours of
observation [13]; our subjects were wild caught). It has long been
known that maturation and experience combine to determine
performance [59]. But only recently has it been shown that, for
example, guppies possess from birth on numerical abilities
(discrimination of small numbers), which unfolds as a result of
both maturation and social learning (discrimination of larger
numbers) [60]. A logical follow up experiment should therefore
test adult cleaners that have been kept in captivity without
simultaneous exposure to residents and visitors.
Methodological considerations
We note that the primates consistently performed poorly despite
the fact that we ultimately adapted the methods to be as
appropriate as possible for each species (within the constraints of
using trays with different ‘behaviors’ to present identical foods). In
particular, the capuchin monkeys received several different
methodologies as we attempted to optimize a protocol which
allowed them to eventually solve the initial task. Variables that
seemed to have helped them included a barrier between the plates
and much shorter time intervals between trials (Table 1). These
shorter inter-trial intervals may have reduced the cost of an
incorrect choice for the primates, potentially making it less likely
for them to learn the task. However, we note several things which
argue against this possibility. First, in the initial phase of pilot
testing with capuchin monkeys, all subjects received ten sessions of
ten trials each (100 total trials, a trial number which allowed all
adult cleaners to learn the task) with 15 minute ITIs between each
trial. No subjects’ choices differed from chance (binomial test, all
ps,0.05 both for individual sessions and when sessions are
combined). Four additional subjects received an additional four
session (40 total trials, for a cumulative total of 140 trials) with
15 minute ITIs between each trial, and again, no subject’s choices
differed from chance (all ps,0.05). Finally, in the last phase of
testing, in which subjects learned the test, ITIs were reduced to
5 minutes (still with 10 trials per session, so an additional 100 trials
total). We note that there were several other factors that changed
between these tests. First, of course, there is an experience effect;
however even with 100 trials with 15 minute, no capuchin learned
within 100 trials, yet all of the fish did so. Additionally, in the first
phase only, the ephemeral tray was pulled back, but not removed
from sight as it was in later phases. While this may have confused
the primates, they are accustomed to food rewards being visible,
but unavailable from their daily life. In fact, being able to see the
food that they could not access could arguably have increased the
magnitude of the negative reinforcement for choosing the other
plate, possibly supporting learning. Finally, there was no divider
between the trays in the first phase of testing, which may have
made it more difficult for the primates to discriminate between the
choices. However, subjects had to reach through one of two
discrete doors, actively pushing open the door in the process, so it
is difficult to see how they could not discriminate between the
options.
The capuchins were all tested prior to the tests with the apes,
and as much as possible we used the final capuchin protocol for
both ape species. The choice tray featured a divider, and non-
chosen options were immediately removed from sight. One thing
that we could not do similarly was the five minute ITI. In pilot
testing, the chimpanzees and orang-utans reacted with extreme
frustration to a 5 minute delay, leaving the testing area and
refusing to return. Thus we shortened the ITI to 90 seconds to
encourage subjects to participate. If, as we found, the capuchins’
behaviour was positively influenced by the shorter ITI, then a
shorter one yet for the apes should have made the task easier.
Additionally, while this might have resulted in less cost per choice,
subjects still only receive 10 trials per session, so there were very
few chances to receive treats during testing (in most cognitive tests,
subjects receive at least two to three times this many trials in a
session). Overall, this meant that the details of the procedure were
optimized during the course of the study for the primates, but not
the fish. Therefore, we consider it unlikely that cleaners
outperformed primates due to advantages with respect to
methodological details like the color or shape of trays, the food,
or the inter-trial interval.
Finally, note that the primates acquired food by reaching out
and grasping it, while fish swam to different foods and took them
directly into their mouths. This was due to differences in body plan
between fish and primates. Fish have to move between compart-
ments with their whole body, but from where they were located
could easily see both rewards simultaneously. Due to the size of the
primates and caging constraints, it was impossible to house them
such that they could simultaneously see both rewards and be
housed in a third room. This would be particularly problematic for
our study if they could not immediately view the ephemeral
reward being removed when they chose the permanent reward
first. Moreover, this procedure would have meant that the
primates had far longer time intervals to both access the first
reward and between the first and second. Additionally, primates
typically make choices by grasping with their hands. Of course,
when comparing species with very different body plans and
abilities, identical procedures may be difficult or impossible, both
for practical reasons (e.g., the presence or absence of hands) and
differences in experience or ways of interacting with the world. In
particular in cases such as ours, in which a species performs
differently than expected, we encourage the use of multiple
procedures in an effort to optimize the design for the species, even
if this results in some methodological differences.
In conclusion, our results provide the first evidence that
cleaners’ sophisticated behavior in cleaning interactions is due to
selection for specific rule learning that require experience and/or
maturation. All three primate species have a complex diet and are
known to cooperate, but still they were outclassed by adult
cleaners in this foraging task. Although we cannot entirely rule out
differences in procedure that resulted from the comparison
between very different species, a possible mechanism underlying
the fishes’ response is that they perceive the leaving of a food
source as a negative reinforcer, and therefore choose the
ephemeral food source first before approaching the permanent
one. This implies that the specificity of the cleaners’ ability to give
priority to ephemeral food sources lies not in a sophisticated
cognitive process but in the ability to identify relevant stimuli.
Nevertheless, recent research on fishes has yielded evidence for
various supposedly more complex cognitive abilities (reviewed by
[61]). As mentioned before, nine-spined sticklebacks use social
learning rules that compare own success relative to the success of
potential models [62,63], and male cichlids may use transitive
inference to assess the strength of potential rivals [64]. But there
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are many other examples. Various coral reef fishes have spawning
traditions [65,66]. Fathead minnows show the ability to generalise
between predators [67]. Groupers signal their intention to hunt to
moray eels in the absence of prey [68]. Guppies’ performance in
relative quantity judgments adheres to that of humans tested in
non verbal numerical tasks [69], and also mosquitofish can use
numbers like primates [70]. On the neurophysiological level there
is recent evidence that the reward structure of fish brains is similar
to that of mammals: hedonistic rewards like receiving tactile
stimulation may yield fitness advantages [71]. With respect to
cleaner wrasse, we note that they express many abilities in the
context of cleaning interactions, including adjustment of service
quality to the presence of a co-inspecting partner [72] and to the
presence of an audience [14], the use of predatory clients as social
tools against chasing non predatory clients [73] and the ability to
remember the ‘when’ and ‘what’ of interactions [74]. These
phenomena are not specific to cleaner wrasse – client interactions,
and they have been linked to more complex cognitive processes
like social awareness [75] and an understanding of other
individuals as agents [76] in studies on primates. It will therefore
be of interest to use cleaner wrasse to test in how far such higher
cognitive processes might be present or absent in a ‘lower’
vertebrate that is nevertheless under similar selective pressures of a
complex social environment.
Methods
Experiments on adult cleaner wrasse were carried out in March
and April 2009 at the University of Neuchaˆtel, Switzerland, while
juvenile cleaner wrasse were tested at Lizard Island Research
Station, Australia, in July and August 2010. Experiments on
capuchins (August to December 2009) and chimpanzees (August
to December 2010) were carried out at the Language Research
Center, Georgia State University, USA, and orang-utans were
tested at Zoo Atlanta, USA (August to December 2010).
Subjects and housing conditions
Cleaner wrasse. Six adult wild caught Labroides dimidiatus
(5.5–7.6 cm total length; TL) of unknown sex were purchased
from a licensed pet shop. All adults were individually housed in
aquaria measuring 60630630 cm3 in size and filled with
Table 1. A summary of information about subjects and experimental protocol.
Adult wrasse Juv. wrasse Chimpanzees Orang-utans Capuchins
General
N individuals 6 7 4 4 8
Date 3–4/09 7–8/10 8/10–4/11 8/10–4/11 8–12/09
Location Neuchaˆtel, CH Lizard Island, AUS LRC GSU, USA Zoo Atlanta, USA LRC GSU, USA
Experiments
Time between trials 15 min 30 min 90 sec 1. 90 sec 1. 15 min
2. 30 sec 2. 5 min
Subject order varied varied varied varied varied
Plate color red-yellow green-grey blue blue green-blue violet-yellow
blue-yellow
green-white pink-grey yellow yellow
Plate side counterbalanced yes yes yes yes 1. no
2.yes
Food type mashed prawn mashed prawn banana cheerios cereal apple
Plate preference test yes no yes yes no
Food already on plate/tray yes yes yes no yes
Removed plate/tray out of view out of view out of view out of view 1. visible
2.out of view
Initial learning test
Maximum N sessions 10 10 10 10 10
Trials per session 10 10 10 10 10
N sessions per day 2 2 1 1 1
N test days per week 7 7 3 5 3
Reverse learning test
Maximum N sessions 10 - 10 10 10
Trials per session 10 - 10 10 10
modifications
reload ephemeral
tray 106per trial
Counterbalance,
tray shape/color
shorter time intervals
Cardboard barrier between plates
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0049068.t001
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approximately 25 l of saltwater (details regarding water available
in Information S1). Juvenile cleaners (1.5–4.5 cm; TL) were
caught with hand-nets from reefs surrounding Lizard Island and
housed individually in glass aquaria (62627637 cm3) with a
continuous flow of fresh sea water. All cleaners were supplied with
an opaque Plexiglas shelter tube (length: 10 cm, Ø=2.5 cm) for
hiding during the day and sleeping at night. Cleaners were first
trained to feed off grey Plexiglas plates, and fed ad libitum every day
to ensure sufficient food intake independent of their performance
during experiments. All individuals were initially fed mashed
prawn flesh or a mixture of mashed prawn flesh and fish flakes.
Individuals were kept for 10 days prior to commencing
experiments.
Primates. All primates were captive born. The eight brown
adult capuchin monkeys (5 males, 3 females, age range 5–20 years,
median age of 10 years) were from two separately housed social
groups at the Language Research Center of Georgia State
University, USA. The four chimpanzees (2 males, 2 females, age
range 25–40 years) were also from the Language Research Center,
whereas the four orang-utans (3 males, 1 female, age range 7–33
years) were from Zoo Atlanta, USA. All primates lived in stable
social groups consisting of adult male(s) and female(s) and any
attendant offspring. They were separated from these groups only
for behavioral and cognitive testing. Details regarding housing
conditions are provided in Information S1. Subjects were fed a
diet according to their species-specific needs, but generally
consisting of primate chow and fresh fruits and vegetables. They
also received enrichment-foods several times per day; consequent-
ly, animals were never food or water deprived for testing purposes.
Running water was available ad libitum at all times. Subjects could
choose not to participate at any time by walking away from the
experimenter.
General procedure
The experimental design was based on a study by Bshary &
Grutter [16]. Some variation occurred in the way the three
primate species were tested (Table 1). Both fish and monkeys had
to make an initial choice between two visually distinct food plates/
trays, both offering the same food in equal quantity: 0.0001–
0.001 g pieces of prawn (highly preferred food) for the fish,
0.560.560.5 cm3 dried apple pieces for the capuchins, cheerios
for the orang-utans and 5 mm slices of banana for the
chimpanzees. Plates and trays varied in size, shape and color
between species in species-appropriate ways (see Table 1). All
plates and trays were attached to handles so that they could be
moved towards subjects but also be retracted rapidly. The
‘‘ephemeral’’ plate would be removed immediately if not chosen
first by the subject, whereas the ‘‘permanent’’ tray would remain
until the subject had taken the food item. Which plate was which
was counterbalanced between individual subjects within a species.
The ephemeral plate mimicked visiting clients with access to
several cleaning stations, which under natural conditions would
leave if they were not inspected immediately [42]. Alternatively,
the permanent plate mimicked resident client species that would
line up to be cleaned [18]. Subjects readily interacted with both
respective plates.
All cleaner wrasse were tested in their aquarium. A separation
with a central sliding door was introduced at approximately two-
thirds of the aquarium length to create an ‘experimental’
compartment and a ‘resting’ compartment. For cleaners, a given
trial started by confining the subject to the smaller ‘resting’
compartment of the aquarium. After approximately 60 s, the
client plates were placed at equal heights at the opposite end of the
aquarium, i.e. the experimental compartment. After about 10 s,
the door was opened and the cleaner could enter the experimental
compartment at will.
For capuchin monkeys, members of each social group,
consisting of four subjects, were simultaneously tested in separated
test chambers attached to their home enclosure. Monkeys had
previously been trained to be separated from their social group
and to individually enter these chambers, where virtually all testing
was done. Dependent offspring were always allowed into the
testing area with their mothers. Testing chambers measured
61644.5633 cm3 in size and were separated from each other by
approximately 40 cm. The test chamber was backed by an opaque
panel, allowing vocal, but no visual or tactile, access to their group.
This allowed us to interact with subjects in a controlled manner
with minimal distractions from the group. The sessions for the
apes were organized in a similar way: subjects were all tested in a
subsection of the indoor section of their home enclosures, while
still in auditory and visible contact with the other group members
(this is how all testing is done at these facilities). The order in which
subjects were tested varied from day to day. As with the capuchins,
dependent offspring were always allowed into the testing area with
their mothers. Note that for all species, acquiring the food required
accessing a separate area from where the subjects were initially
located. For fish, this required swimming, while for the primates
this required reaching outside of the compartment.
Presentation of plates
The position of the two plates was randomized, but with an
equal number of presentations on each side within each 10 trial
sessions. Randomization was constrained such that the same tray
was never presented more than three consecutive times on the
same side. (Note that capuchins were initially tested with the plates
altering sides between sessions; see Table 1). The two plates were
placed far enough apart that, following a choice of the permanent
plate, the experimenter could remove the ephemeral plate before
the subject could take the food. It proved impossible to put the
trays far enough apart to stop the capuchins from grabbing both
food items simultaneously, so we added trapdoors to allow access
to only one at a time. These consisted of two doors attached to
each other by a string that worked in a drawbridge-like fashion,
pulling one door closed when the other was pushed open. No
special constructions were required for the great apes, as the mesh
structure of the cage prevented them from quickly grabbing both
items simultaneously. The procedures were identical for the
reversal learning phase, except that the plates’ behavior was
reversed abruptly, i.e., the previous ephemeral plate now behaved
like the permanent while the previous permanent plate became the
ephemeral plate. There were differences between experimental
groups concerning the number of sessions per day (one or two; all
of ten trials), the number of testing days per week (every day for
cleaners, but 5 days per week for orang-utans and 3 days per week
for capuchins and chimpanzees), and the time interval between
successive trials (15 or 30 min for the cleaners and generally
shorter for the primates). See Table 1 for specific details.
Learning criterion
We based our significance criterion on Sign-Tests-Table (two-
tailed). Significance was reached when a subject made correct
choices on $9/10 trials on one session or $8/10 on two or $7/
10 trials on three consecutive sessions. For capuchins in the initial
sessions, the criterion for learning was $16/20 trials (e.g., over 2
sessions) because plate positions were constant during a session and
hence a side bias would have led to the inaccurate assessment of
significant ‘‘learning’’ in half of sessions (and significant ‘‘anti-
learning’’ in the others). Once an individual had reached criterion,
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we ran the reversal trials. We used the same criterion for the
reversal test. We were primarily interested in relative performance
rather than the question whether all subjects can learn to develop a
food maximizing preference eventually if given sufficient oppor-
tunity. Adult cleaner wrasses were the first to be tested out of all
the experimental groups. They formed the baseline for the others
with respect to the questions we attempted to answer. As all of
them learned to solve both the initial and reversal tasks within 100
trials, we fixed 100 trials as an upper limit for the other
experimental groups. Because the reversal learning task required
learning of the initial task, we decided to expose any primate that
failed to learn the initial task within 100 trials to modified versions
of the task. The modifications were designed to facilitate learning
(see Table 1). Some of the modifications were included in the
reversal learning task, such as re-baiting of the ephemeral plate for
orang-utans when a subject chose correctly. In addition, as
capuchins were the first primates tested, we adopted some of the
experimental features that seemed to have helped them to learn
the task (shorter between trial intervals, more visually distinct
plates, counterbalanced presentation of plates within sessions) for
the experiments on the great apes (see Table 1).
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